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Is Three a Crowd? Competition Among Regulators in Banking
We have an unnecessary and unwise division of our commercial banks into national and state banks with forty-nine legislative bodies regulating and granting special privileges to their respective banks. . . . These conditions have been permitted to prevail for no better reason that as a concession to historical precedent and the doctrine of states' rights. . . . [T] here is no logical basis on which to defend the present [regulatory choices] of our banks. Spahr (1932) Take a banking system governed by three federal and 50 state regulatory agencies that compete more often than they cooperate. Mix in three massive bank failures in less than 18 months, and add a charged-up liberal Congress that includes militant, new chairmen for both the House and Senate banking committees. The result is more turmoil in the field of bank supervision than at any time since the 1930s, with the regulatory agencies jockeying for top position and with Congress threatening to write new rules of its own. Business Week (April 21, 1975) As There have been debates over the optimal structure of bank regulation in the United States since at least the National Banking Act of 1863. As the three quotes above indicate, the controversy is focused on the question of whether regulatory authority should be spread among different agencies rather than be vested in a single agency. Similar questions arise in other contexts as well. In securities law, antitrust enforcement and environmental policy, there are arguments over whether the main regulatory authority should be at the state or federal level. To the extent that firms select where to incorporate and locate factories, state chartering regulation allows them to pick their regulator. In international trade, the issue is whether to harmonize policy across nations. Without harmonization, firms can migrate to the country with the most lax regulation. This paper examines whether having multiple regulators covering the same industry is beneficial. We focus on the banking industry since it offers an excellent opportunity to study regulatory behavior because commercial banks choose among three primary federal regulators.
The identity of the primary federal regulator of a commercial bank depends on a bank's chartering agency and on whether it is a Federal Reserve System ("Fed") member. A nationally- To examine how the regulatory structure interacts with the risk and return choices of banks, we focus on banks that switch primary regulators, asking why banks switch and, after they do, what the effect on performance is. We study the decision to change regulators rather than a bank's initial choice of regulators for two reasons. First, new banks are not representative of the entire industry. Most are either very small or formed as the result of a merger. Thus, their choices may not shed light on the regulation of other banks. Second, one of the aspects of regulation that we want to examine is the interaction between banks and regulators. This is not possible with newly-formed banks since they have no history of interaction with a regulator.
Thus, we focus on regulatory structure and the choice of regulator by established banks.
One focus of the existing literature on regulatory structure is whether there is a "race for the bottom" among regulatory agencies. Since the budget of an agency depends in part on the number and size of the firms it regulates, regulators might compete against each other by offering lenient treatment in order to attract firms. When Chase Manhattan Bank elected to have a state charter rather than a national one subsequent to its merger with Chemical Bank in 1995, the OCC lost fees amounting to 2% of its budget. If the OCC was concerned with maximizing its budget, it would have an incentive to remove burdens on Chase Manhattan (or its managers) to get them back to the OCC.
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Another possibility explored in the literature is that regulatory competition may be a good thing. Tiebout (1956) presents a model of public good provision by local communities that has often been modified to examine other issues of regulation. The Tiebout framework can be used to show that under certain conditions (including no externalities and costless mobility), regulatory competition leads to optimal standards setting. Different localities can offer a menu of public goods, with each individual choosing the menu that is best for her or him (we call this Tiebout sorting). This model underlies the arguments for local control of securities regulation (Romano, 1998) , antitrust enforcement (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991) , and environmental policy (Revesz, 2000) . These papers also claim that the benefits of competition among local agencies mean that there is (or should be) no race for the bottom.
1 Regulatory authority for state-chartered banks is shared with the appropriate state chartering agencies. 2 Another potential drawback of having multiple regulatory agencies from which to choose is that the agencies may respond to their constituencies but ignore externalities. When externalities are important, control by local agencies may lead to too little regulation (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Stewart, 1992) . As an example, for many years Britain did not control sulfur emissions from its power plants because prevailing winds blew them offshore, with most of the damage being felt in continental Europe (Lomas, 1988) . We do not examine this here, since this sort of externality is not a big problem in banking.
The evidence on competition among regulators is limited. There are several studies of competition among regulators that focus on state corporate governance rules. When firms switch the state in which they are incorporated, stock prices show no significant reaction or slight increases suggesting that the ability to switch regulators may have benefited firms (Bradley and Schipani, 1989; Romano, 1985) . On the other hand, when states pass laws making it easier for firms to avoid hostile takeovers, stock prices fall suggesting a race for the bottom (Alexander et. al., 1997; Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989) . The common factor in these studies is that states seem to be acting to benefit those who are likely to decide where firms are chartered, that is, the firms' managers. Whether this is good or bad for the public depends on the degree of managershareholder agency problems. One contribution of this study is that we are able to test for both regulatory behavior and manager-shareholder agency problems at the same time.
An additional complication in banking is that a bank regulatory agency is essentially a collection of examiners. Unlike regulators in many other areas, examiners in banking frequently make subjective decisions about the banks they visit. 3 Berger, et. al. (2000) reviews examiner and regulatory agency discretion when monitoring banks. Examiners go in a bank to evaluate its risk. Based on this assessment, the examiners decide whether the bank's reserve for loan losses is sufficient and then assign a strength rating to the bank (the CAMELS rating). If a bank wants to change its portfolio, its examiner must decide how to react. The examiner can either accede or make the change costly for the bank by requesting a higher loan loss reserve (resulting in a charge against income) or by giving the bank a lower CAMELS rating (resulting in more regulatory costs for the bank). 4 Thus, to an extent, examiners can decide how costly it is for a bank to add risk.
Examiners can exploit the discretion they have when examining a bank to maximize their own utilities. One interest of some examiners may be to lead a "quiet life." 5 That is, they may want to get by with as little work and as little career risk as possible. This study is the first to test whether there is evidence that examiners act so as to lead a quiet life.
To get a quiet life, an examiner might want the banks she regulates to have as simple a portfolio to evaluate as possible. Some assets are more difficult to evaluate than others. For example, determining whether a typical real estate construction loan is troubled takes more effort 3 In other industries, interpretation of regulations most frequently comes at the agency level. There is a literature that looks at whether regulatory agencies act as Congress wants them to. Libecap (1996) contains a number of articles addressing this question. 4 Evidence of the power examiners hold over banks is mostly indirect. For example, in 1991 Alan Greenspan was worried that examiners were contributing to a "credit crunch" by requiring banks to hold to much capital against loans. He felt that examiners were using their discretion to be too tough on banks. See also Berger and Udell (1994) . 5 Berger and Hannan (1998) talk about the desire by bankers for a quiet life.
than the same determination for a typical pool of home mortgage loans. Thus, an examiner might pressure a bank to keep assets such as home mortgages rather than switch to complicated assets like real estate construction loans.
The workload of an examiner also can increase when a bank she regulates changes strategy.
A change in the asset portfolio, all else equal, makes work for the examiner. She has new loans to evaluate, and perhaps must learn the risk-return tradeoff for a new type of loan. Thus, if she wants a quiet life, an examiner might want to discourage changes in the composition of the portfolios of banks she examines.
There is another reason why examiners may put up roadblocks to change by banks.
Regulatory behavior also may be influenced by a desire to avoid criticism from groups other than the firms they regulate. 6 Importantly, Congress and public interest groups may criticize ex post actions that were proper ex ante (as Kane, 1989 , argues was done early in the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s). This gives regulatory agencies, and by extension examiners, an incentive to avoid actions that the regulator thinks could increase the risk of bank failure. Fear of criticism may induce risk aversion on the part of examiners who want a quiet life.
One goal of this paper is to test whether there is evidence in the regulatory decision-making process of a race for the bottom, Tiebout sorting, or a desire for the quiet life by examiners. As a secondary goal, we attempt to shed light on other possible motivations for regulatory and bank actions, including manager-shareholder conflicts. The evidence here is consistent with both Tiebout sorting and the quiet life hypothesis, and there is evidence against all the alternative explanations of regulatory behavior. We find that banks that switch regulators increase their return after the switch while risk changes little, consistent with beneficial competition among regulators. Holding risk and everything else constant, banks are more likely to switch regulators when the banks are changing their portfolios in any direction. Since these changes generate work for examiners, this is consistent with the quiet life hypothesis. There is some evidence of sorting since some switches seem motivated by specialization across regulators.
The paper consists of six sections. The first section sets out the major hypotheses and data sources. The next section looks at the probability that a bank changes its primary regulator as a function of bank characteristics. The third section examines the performance of banks that switch regulators. The next section focuses on the individual regulatory agencies (that is, the OCC, the Fed, and the FDIC). We examine whether any of the findings in the prior sections are specific to 6 Stigler (1971) points out that regulators can be captured by the industries they regulate because firms in the industry care a lot more about the regulators decisions than outsiders. Peltzman (1976) and others extend Stigler's argument by pointing out that any organized interest group can have an influence on policy.
a single regulator. The fifth section discusses robustness. Finally, the last section offers concluding comments.
Hypotheses and data
To provide the underpinnings for the empirical work in later sections, this section reviews the reasons why a bank might switch regulators. When bank managers are asked why they change primary regulators, they generally respond in one of two ways. They claim that the switch either saves on regulatory compliance costs (as Chase Manhattan Bank did after its merger with Chemical Bank in 1995) or allows them additional powers (as Chase did when it changed the primary regulator of its Delaware bank in 1990).
The costs of regulation include the managerial and legal costs involved in meeting with bank examiners and making required reports to regulators (such as the Call Reports) and to consumers (such as the Truth in Savings rules). They also include the opportunity costs of restrictions on portfolio choices imposed by regulators such as reserve requirements and expedited funds availability. It is difficult to quantify the savings from a regulatory switch since estimates of the total cost of regulation vary widely. Elliehausen (1998) gives estimates of the cost of regulation that range between 5 and 15 percent of noninterest expense, or between 2 and 6 percentage points of return on equity. So, if the differences across regulators are large, it can have a measurable effect on a bank's bottom line.
Regulatory switches by banks that are primarily designed to save money should mainly affect the banks' returns, allowing the banks to move to a more favorable risk-return tradeoff. Also, since the return savings will come mostly from overhead expenses, banks should have little or no (expected) change in their loan portfolios as a result of changing regulators. We take as our null hypothesis:
H0 (cost savings): Banks move to a more favorable risk-return tradeoff when they switch primary federal regulators, although any change in risk should be small. The switch is not associated with a change in loan portfolios.
Public interest -Tiebout sorting
Banks may choose regulators based on the basket of services provided by each regulatory agency and its examiners. Consistent with the Tiebout hypothesis, a bank may change regulators when it desires a different set of services, such as when it is otherwise changing its business strategy.
Some regulations differ across agencies, although these differences are generally minor. 7 But for some banks and some issues, the differences might be important enough to induce a switch.
During the sample period, for example, the insurance powers granted to banks varied across regulators. To conduct certain insurance activities, a bank may have needed to switch regulators.
Switches like these that allow a bank to take advantage of a new, profitable activity should lead to an increase in return (or, more precisely, a shift to a better risk-return tradeoff).
Switching to a new regulatory agency may be part of a general shift in a bank's portfolio. There may also be other changes in a bank's portfolio that occur around the time of the switch of regulators.
Race for the bottom
If regulatory agencies want to maximize their budgets or their domain, then they will compete for firms. A race for the bottom occurs when this competition is at the expense of the public interest. One job of bank regulatory agencies is to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system by preventing banks from taking excessive risk. Given this, one way the agencies can compete for banks is by being less stringent about safety and soundness. This is the "competition for laxity" that Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns spoke about in 1974. 8 His worry was that agencies would try to attract banks by letting the banks take more risk without a compensating increase in return. This is not in the public interest because it increases the risk of bank failures, and hence the expected payments to insured depositors by the FDIC. We capture this in the data by looking for banks that increase risk without increasing return after switching regulators:
7 Butler and Macey (1988) point out that one reason that differences across regulators are not very large is the use of federal supremacy laws. In essence, federal regulators impose their rules on state-chartered banks through direct regulation or by making federal deposit insurance conditional on accepting certain rules. 8 Scott (1977) implicitly assumes that all regulatory agencies are competing for laxity. If the competition is limited to one or two agencies, then it might not show up in the aggregate data. In Section 4, we examine whether an individual agency, possibly in order to increase the number of banks it regulates, allows banks to increase risk taking after they switch to it.
Quiet life
Another alternative hypothesis is that bank examiners want a quiet life. Examiners have a quiet life when they have minimal work and minimal career risk. A quiet life is more likely when the banks that examiners regulate change very little, when the banks shift from assets that are difficult to evaluate to those that are easier, and when the banks have low failure risk. We examine all of these possibilities.
Examiners may not want banks they regulate to change portfolios because that adds work for the examiner or because the changes would be bad for society. Since we want to distinguish examiners acting in their own private interest from those acting in the public interest, we look for examples where banks are impeded in their attempts to make value-adding changes: 9 H3 (quiet life -minimum change): A bank is more likely to switch regulatory agencies when it is changing its portfolio. These changes may involve increasing or decreasing risk. After changing agencies, the bank moves to a more favorable risk-return tradeoff.
The changes in portfolio we examine include changes in leverage and other measures of risk, as well as changes in the loan portfolio without regard to whether they change risk.
The less a bank changes, the happier the examiner is, and the less pressure she puts on the bank. Thus, 'quiet' banks -those that have little change their loan portfolios and riskshould be less likely to switch regulators than their more active counterparts.
An alternative way that bank examiners could live a quiet life is if the portfolios of the banks they regulate are as simple to evaluate as possible. While there is no measure of portfolio simplicity, it is likely that certain classes of assets are easier to evaluate than others. Thus, examiners should want the banks they regulate to move toward these asset classes:
H4 (quiet life -simple): A bank is more likely to switch regulatory agencies when it is changing its portfolio toward a portfolio that is more difficult for an examiner to evaluate. These changes may involve increasing or decreasing risk.
After changing agencies, the bank moves to a more favorable risk-return tradeoff.
To test H4, we examine how changes in different categories of assets affect the likelihood of switching regulators. One potential difficulty is that the assets that are likely to be difficult to evaluate, such as real estate construction loans and commercial real estate loans, are riskier than assets that are easier to evaluate, such home mortgage loans and Treasury securities. Thus, we may not be able to distinguish a bank becoming easier to examine because of examiner pressure from a bank getting safer overall for other reasons.
Finally, examiners might want to avoid being blamed for the failure of banks they regulate.
This would cause them to want the banks they regulate to have portfolios that are as safe as possible. As noted in the previous paragraph, in general, safe portfolios are among the simplest to evaluate. Thus, we can interpret support for H4 as evidence that examiners might be minimizing career risk as well as their workload.
Managerial explanations
There is another agency conflict in banking -the one between bank managers and shareholders. If bank managers are acting in shareholders' interests, then any increase in a bank's risk should be accompanied by an increase in return. However, an increase in risk could also reflect a bank manager's reaction to changes in the quality of investments available to the bank. Gorton and Rosen (1995) show that during the 1980s, banking was in a period of decline. They also note that if the bank managers most affected by the decline continued their existing approach, return at their banks would fall, increasing the chance that the managers would be fired.
On the other hand, the managers knew more about the risks they were taking than outsiders, including outside shareholders. If the managers increased risk, even at the expense of expected return, they might get high enough realized returns to keep their jobs. 10 The key was that outsiders did not realize that the bank was moving to a worse risk-return tradeoff. Since the same examiners visit a bank repeatedly, the current examiner of a bank may know more about the bank's risk than either an outsider or a new examiner. Thus, switching regulatory agencies gives the bank a new examiner who may have difficulty determining both the level of risk at the bank and whether the risk is compensated by a higher expected return. 11 Therefore, finding that banks increased risk but not return may reflect the manager-shareholder conflict rather than any problems with regulators 12 : H5 (managerial risk taking): Banks switch regulators concurrent with adding risk. Performance does not improve after the change.
The manager-shareholder conflict may also manifest itself in scapegoating. When a bank manager does poorly, he may want to shift blame from his performance to external circumstances. One way to do this is to blame the examiner. Thus, we might see banks switching agencies after poor performance. This need not be accompanied by a change in the bank's portfolio. If the regulator is indeed at fault, then performance should increase after a switch while if it is scapegoating, then there should be no improvement:
H6 (scapegoating): Banks are more likely to switch regulators after poor performance. Performance does not improve after the change. Table 1 provides a summary of the hypotheses and their predictions. We divide the hypotheses into those that imply that regulatory choice is beneficial and those that imply that it is not. If banks are able to save on regulatory compliance costs (H0), take advantage of beneficial competition among regulators (Tiebout sorting; H1), or avoid examiners wanting a quiet life (H3 and H4), then switching regulators allows banks to move to better risk-return tradeoffs. To distinguish among these hypotheses, we examine the asset portfolios of banks. We expect little change on average in the loan portfolios of banks that switch to save costs. Both Tiebout sorting and the quiet life imply that banks change their portfolios when switching regulators. However, Tiebout sorting implies that the change should come after the switch while the quiet life is consistent with changes in the portfolio leading to a switch. In addition, Tiebout sorting implies some specialization by regulators. This specialization might be reflected by differences in the types of investments made or risks taken by banks as a function of the regulator chosen.
Summary of the hypotheses
The remaining three hypotheses, a race for the bottom among regulatory agencies (H2), managerial risk taking (H5), and scapegoating (H6), imply that a bank's risk-return tradeoff should not improve after a switch. It is difficult to differentiate a race for the bottom from managerial risk taking. Both hypotheses predict that risk increases after a bank switches regulators. However, if we assume that banking was in decline in the early part of our sample (1980s) but not the later part of the sample (1990s), we can look at whether managerial risk taking holds early but not late. This could either reflect a race for the bottom in only one part of the sample or managerial risk taking.
Data
To test our hypotheses, we focus on banks that changed primary regulatory agencies between 1983 and 1999. Banks have been switching agencies for many years (Scott, 1977, documents switches from 1950 to 1974). However, our sample starts after the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) in 1980. Prior to DIDMCA, there were important differences across regulators. For example, reserve requirements depended on whether a bank was a member of the Federal Reserve System. DIDMCA leveled the playing field for banks that were and were not members of the Federal Reserve System. It is possible that many of the regulatory switches that occurred prior to and immediately after passage of DIDMCA were related to major differences in regulations rather than the implementation of the regulations. Table 2 gives an overview of the banks that switched primary regulators. Table 2 looks at the direction of regulatory changes. Most banks that switched regulators were either moving to or away from primary federal regulation by the FDIC (state nonmember status). This is not surprising, since the FDIC regulates sixty percent of banks.
Relative to a situation where switches had been in proportion to the share of banks regulated by each agency, the Fed was the biggest gainer and the OCC the biggest loser. There were a net of 303 switches to the Fed and 300 away from the OCC compared to proportional changes.
Balance sheet and income data for banks comes from the year-end Call Reports of Income and Condition (Call Reports) that banks are required to file. Table 3 gives data on the variables used in the paper. 13 We measure return using return on equity (ROE) and risk using three measures: the equity-to-assets ratio, the loan-to-assets ratio, and the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. The equity-to-asset ratio is a measure of leverage, with higher values indicating lower risk. Loans are riskier than most other (on-balance sheet) bank assets, so we interpret an increase in the loan-to-asset ratio as an indicator of higher risk. The nonperforming loans-toloans ratio reflects expected losses on loans made in the past. A riskier loan portfolio, all else equal, has higher nonperforming loans. Nonperforming loans can also reflect bad luck, bad management, or investments in risky but predictable loans (such as some credit card loans).
Therefore results based on an analysis of nonperforming loans should be viewed with caution.
We can also view the loan-to-assets ratio and the nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio as proxies for the workload of bank examiners. Examiners have to spend more effort reviewing loans than other assets and nonperforming loans than other loans. If examiners desire a quiet life, they would prefer banks to have nonloan assets such as cash and government securities and they would like the banks not to issue loans with a high probability of becoming nonperforming.
Why banks change regulators
This section examines the characteristics that predict whether banks switch primary regulators. To do this, we must control for other reasons that banks might switch primary regulators. For example, we expect that banks are more likely to switch regulators after a major corporate change such as a merger or when they belong to a holding company that has banks with different primary regulators.
The model used to predict switches is:
where Regulator Change is one if the bank changes regulator in year t and zero otherwise. The independent variables are described below and summarized in Table 3 .
Bank risk change
We measure changes in risk in two separate ways. First, we include the difference in the primary risk ratios at the end of year t from their value at the end of year t -2. Notice that we include changes in year t, the year of any potential regulatory shift. We do this for two reasons:
First, we do not have an exact date for a switch. Also, we are much more concerned with changes in the policy of a bank that the bank examiner can see. It takes time to implement such changes, but it is likely that a bank (and its examiners) know months in advance that the bank is adding risk that might be reflected in these ratios. Thus, while some of the change may occur after any switch, most of the planning for the change takes place prior to the switch.
Estimating changes in risk ratios using continuous variables may be misleading. Banks may run in to resistance from a regulatory agency or an examiner not as a function of how big a change in risk they make but if the change in risk exceeds some threshold level. To capture the possibility of a discrete change in regulatory behavior when risk at a bank increases beyond a threshold, we include dummy variables that have the value one if a bank's risk increase is in the top quartile of changes at all banks and dummy variables that have the value one if a bank's risk increase is in the bottom quartile of changes at all banks.
Quiet life variables: bank portfolio change and assets that are simple to evaluate
We use shifts within bank loan portfolios to define our quiet life variables. To examine loan portfolio changes, we split the loan portfolio into seven categories: real estate construction loans, commercial real estate loans, home mortgage loans, other real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, and other loans. For each of these, we measure the percentage change in that category of loans as a fraction of total loans between the ends of year t -2 and year t. That is, if real estate construction loans go from 10 percent of total loans to 15 percent of total loans, the percentage change is 5 percent.
We measure loan portfolio change as the sum of the absolute values of the percentage changes in each type of loan:
Loan portfolio change = Σ | change in loan type i between years t-2 and t |, where the sum is taken over the seven different types of loans. Higher values of loan portfolio change should make it more difficult for a bank examiner to have a quiet life. We include both the continuous version of loan portfolio change as well as dummy variables for whether the change is in the top quartile or the bottom quartile.
There is no unambiguous measure of which types of loans are simplest for a bank examiner to evaluate. However, we assume that categories with loans that are typically larger and less homogeneous are probably more difficult to evaluate. Thus, we use real estate construction loans, commercial real estate loans, and commercial and industrial loans as proxies for difficult to evaluate loans with home mortgage loans and consumer loans serving as proxies for loans that are easier to evaluate. We include dummy variables for whether the change in each of our seven categories of loans is in the top quartile to capture the effects of evaluation difficulty on the probability of switching regulators.
Control variables
The primary hypothesis we are testing in this section is that banks change regulators when they are adding risk or otherwise changing their portfolio. To control for a bank's existing levels of risk and return, we include the equity-to-assets ratio, the loan-to-assets ratio, the nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio, and ROE (adding additional risk and return variables as controls does not change the qualitative results). We use the log of total assets as a control, since larger banks are more diversified, all else equal. We also include the log of total assets squared, since Table 2 suggests a quadratic relationship between assets and switches. All these variables are as of the end of year t -1 except ROE, which is for the entire year t -1.
We also want to control for other reasons unrelated to risk, return, and portfolio change that may lead a bank to shift its primary regulator. These controls include a dummy for merger activity. The dummy has a value of one if the bank or its holding company has been involved in a merger with a banking organization in year t or year t-1. Breaking down mergers by type, such as mergers between banks within a holding company versus acquisitions of outside banks, does not change the qualitative results. We also control for holding company status using dummies for whether the bank is the lead bank in a holding company, or whether it is a non-lead bank within a holding company that has the same or a different charter than the lead bank (banks not in a holding company are the excluded category). This allows us to test for switches to unify the regulators a holding company reports to. The holding company status variables are all as of the end of year t -1.
There may also be other differences across primary regulators. To control for this, we include dummies for whether a bank is regulated by the Federal Reserve or the FDIC at the end of year t -1 (the OCC is the omitted category). In Section 4, we examine in more detail the extent to which the pattern of changes depends on the regulators.
Finally, year dummies are included to control for systemic changes such as changes in the banking economy. Table 4 presents the results of a logistic regression of (1). 14 The first column shows that the control variables are important predictors of regulatory switches. Banks are more likely to switch if they have merged, are within a holding company (especially if they are not the lead bank), are performing poorly, or are larger. These results are consistent with banks changing agencies as the result of corporate reorganization or to simplify their regulation. One slightly puzzling result is that a bank is more likely to switch when it is not the lead bank in a holding company if it has the same charter as the lead bank. This may reflect the use of special purpose non-lead banks to exploit the differences in regulation. There is also a pattern across the regulators with banks at the Fed and FDIC more likely to switch than those at the OCC. We explore this further in Section 4.
Results
The second column of Further support is provided by the loan portfolio change variables. 'Quiet' banks -those in the bottom quartile in loan changes -are less likely than average to switch regulatory agencies while 'active' banks -those in the top quartile in loan changes -are more likely to switch.
In the fourth column, we add dummies for the growth in individual loan shares. We include dummies that are one if a bank's increase in the proportion of loans of a given type was in the top 25 percent of the changes in that type of loan at all banks over the previous two years. None of the coefficients on the quartile dummies for the individual loan shares is significant, suggesting again that it is the act of changing rather than the types of changes made that is key. 16 This fails to support the simple-to-evaluate version of the quiet life hypothesis. Since almost all nonloan assets of banks are cash, buildings, or government securities such as Treasury bonds, the loan-toasset ratio offers a proxy for how hard a portfolio is to evaluate. The coefficient on the loan-toasset ratio is not significant, providing no evidence for the simple-to-evaluate version of the quiet life hypothesis. We return to this in Section 4, when we examine the individual regulatory agencies.
We also include changes in return in the regressions in Table 4 . The results imply that after controlling for other factors, banks are more likely to switch regulators when their return is increasing and less likely when it is decreasing. This is evidence against the scapegoating hypothesis since when returns are increasing banks have no need to make regulators a scapegoat.
Much of the explanatory power in the regressions comes from the merger variable and the holding company structure variables. This is consistent with many switches being motivated by organizational issues within banks. For example, multibank holding companies may want to simplify regulation under a single agency or the acquiring bank in a merger may want to take the charter of its target. We would like to eliminate switches motivated by changes in corporate structure to see if other banks that switch appear to be reacting to regulatory actions. To do this,
we estimate the predictive model (1) for banks that have not recently merged and are not in a multibank holding company. The results, presented in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 4 , are qualitatively similar to those for the full sample. There is one important difference. The smaller sample provides some support for the simple-to-evaluate version of the quiet life hypothesis. The coefficient on the top quartile of changes in the loan-to-asset ratio is significantly positive in both regressions and the coefficient on commercial and industrial loans is weakly positive in the final regression. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis.
Overall, the results provide support for the quiet life hypothesis against the null hypothesis that bank switch only to save on costs. Large changes in bank portfolios are associated with higher probabilities of switching regulators even when risk is controlled for. When we exclude banks that are in multibank holding companies or have recently merged, then we find that an increase in difficult-to-evaluate assets is associated with a higher probability of a switch.
The performance of banks that switch primary regulators
This section looks at the pre-and post-switch performance of banks. In the previous section, we show that a bank is more likely to change its primary regulatory agency when it is changing its portfolio or when it is adding assets that are difficult to evaluate. This is consistent with the quiet life hypotheses, but the hypotheses have a second part -we have not yet examined whether regulators impede these changes when they are value adding. For this, we need to look at whether banks performance improves after a switch of regulators. Looking at performance around a switch also sheds light on the other hypotheses.
Return is higher in the year following a change of regulators than in the year prior to a change of regulators. Return on equity at banks that switch regulators rises from 9.98% in the year prior to the switch to 11.43% in the year after, an increase of 1.45 percentage points. This is both statistically and economically significant. There is little if any increase in risk surrounding a switch, with the equity-to-assets and loan-to-assets ratios rising by less than 3% each and the nonperforming-loans-to-loans ratio falling. A large increase in return with at most a small change in risk is evidence that bank performance improves after a regulatory switch. But these performance changes may not be the result of the switch. To control for other factors that can explain return and risk, we use the following model:
where the model is estimated for the return variable and the three risk variables over the entire sample. We use the same control variables as in the regressions to predict regulatory switches, omitting return variables for the return regressions and some risk variables for the risk regressions. We also include the absolute value of the loan portfolio change since we believe it might be a proxy for costs involved in altering bank policy.
The results in the previous section were consistent with the quiet life hypotheses. If return is increasing and risk changing (either up or down), then this would provide further evidence that examiners want a quiet life. As shown in Table 1 , Tiebout sorting is also consistent with a move to a better risk-return tradeoff. On the other hand, a race for the bottom and managerial risktaking predict an increase in risk after the switch without a move to a better risk-return tradeoff.
A priori, we have no reason to believe that the changes induced by a switch of regulators should be immediately reflected in performance. For this reason, we look over a variety of time horizons surrounding a regulatory change. In Table 5 , we present results that focus on two and five year periods before and after a switch. 17 This allows a long enough time before a switch to see whether there was some change in a bank's performance that might prompt a switch. It also allows a long enough time after a switch to ensure that all the changes that result from it are reflected in the accounting data we examine. For banks that switch regulators, we use dummy variables for pre-and post-switch periods as well as a trend variable for the longer horizon (specific definitions are given in the table). As seen in the table, return increases after a switch.
Although trend in return is positive going into a switch, it increases significantly following a switch. Most of the change in return occurs at least two years after the switch. The results also indicate that the equity-to-assets ratio weakly decreases following a switch, the loan-to-asset ratio increases, and the nonperforming-loans-to-loans ratio decreases. These results are robust to changes in the five-year horizon, but the two years before and after a switch seem to be different than other years. The generally flat performance in the two years after a switch may reflect the time necessary for changes initiated after the switch to show up in the accounting data.
The results in Table 5 show banks generally move to a more favorable risk-return tradeoff after they switch regulators, with at most a minor increase in risk. Along with the increase in return, the decline in the nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio with a roughly steady equity-toassets ratio implies that the expected failure rate of banks that switch is no higher, and probably lower, after a switch compared with before. Thus, the results are consistent with Tiebout sorting and the quiet life hypothesis, since both predict that the risk-return tradeoff is better after a switch. The results, however, are inconsistent with the new regulatory agency allowing a bank that has switched to take socially excessive risk, and thus inconsistent with agencies being engaged in a race for the bottom. Increasing return and weakly decreasing risk also rules out the two managerial explanations for switches since managerial risk-taking should lead to an increase in risk and scapegoating is not associated with higher return.
Individual regulatory agencies
The purpose of this section is to provide tests of Tiebout sorting and to determine if some of the other hypotheses hold for one or two, but not all, the regulatory agencies. Tiebout sorting implies that the three bank regulatory agencies specialize in their manner of regulation. Banks can choose the agency that best meets their needs. Prompting for specialization may derive from the fact that the three bank regulatory agencies have very different responsibilities and positions within the government. These responsibilities and relationships may affect the way the agencies regulate banks. The OCC is part of the Treasury Department, and thus is under the President.
The Fed is an independent agency that also has the responsibility for monetary policy. Its attitude toward regulation might be colored by the importance of controlling inflation. The FDIC is also an independent agency. It supervises the deposit insurance fund, and that may influence its attitude toward bank failures.
The Tiebout sorting hypothesis implies that there should be clear differences in the types of banks that switch to each regulator. To test this, we examine a predictive model focusing on the regulator that is being switched to. That is, for each regulatory agency, we use the predictive model (1) to examine the probability that a bank not regulated by that agency at the end of year t -1 switches to the agency during year t.
18 Table 6 presents evidence on the probability that a bank switches to a particular regulator.
The coefficients are generally consistent with the full sample results for all three regulators, with the exception of the loan share variables. The loan share variables indicate that regulators seem to specialize in different loan categories. Banks that are increasing consumer loans are more likely to shift to the OCC, banks that are increasing commercial loans (including commercial real estate loans) are more likely to shift to the Federal Reserve, and banks that are increasing real estate construction loans are more likely to shift to the FDIC. This is consistent with the loan shares held by all banks (not shown). Controlling for size and holding company structure, banks 18 For robustness, we ran a multinomial logistic model asking which regulator a bank would have in year t given its regulator in year t -1. The results are consistent with the results here, although fewer variables are statistically significant because the multinomial logit in effect splits the sample into smaller subsamples. Moreover, it is more difficult to look at the regulator that is being switched to since you have to combine the results of two multinomial regressions (for banks switching from each of the other two regulators).
at the OCC hold more consumer loans, banks at the Federal Reserve more commercial loans (overall, but not more commercial real estate loans), and banks at the FDIC more real estate construction loans. This provides support for Tiebout sorting.
The results of the predictive model do not support a conclusion that one regulator is attracting primarily weak banks. The coefficient on the dummy indicating an increase in return is positive at all three agencies, although only statistically significant for banks switching to the FDIC.
However, the other two agencies attract banks that have a statistically significantly higher probability of being banks with declining nonperforming loans.
The evidence implies that regulators are specializing, but that does not show that specialization is in the public interest. To test that, we need to examine the change in performance after a switch. As in the previous section, we look at the pre-and post-switch performance of banks that switch regulators controlling for other factors that could influence performance. We start with (2), the same model as in Section 3, but we include interaction variables between the pre-and post-switch variables and the regulator at the end of year t -1 (the conclusions are the same when we interact the variables with the regulator at the end of year t). Table 7 presents the results for the interaction variables. As an example of how to interpret the table, the variable for the trend prior to the switch for banks from the OCC is the pre-switch trend variable multiplied by a dummy that is one for banks that switch from the OCC in year t. The positive coefficient on that variable indicates that -controlling for mergers, holding company status, size, and risk -banks that left the OCC in year t were increasing ROE prior to switching.
Overall, the results in Table 7 show that for banks that switch from all three agencies, return rises or risk falls. This suggests that banks are shifting to a better risk-return tradeoff when they switch. This provides further support for Tiebout sorting.
We can also use the results in Table 7 to shed light on some of the other hypothesis. The race for the bottom and managerial risk-taking imply a higher risk with possibly a worse risk-return tradeoff after a switch while scapegoating implies that performance in general should not improve after a switch. Banks leaving the OCC are increasing return without increasing risk, providing no support to any of the hypotheses. Banks leaving the Fed have higher leverage (a lower equity-toassets ratio) but lower nonperforming loans. Since banks that leave the Fed also increase return, it is unlikely that they significantly increase failure risk. The return at banks leaving the FDIC is economically and statistically no different after they switch than before. These banks increase their loans-to-assets ratio, but experience a decline in their nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio after they switch. On average, the ratio of nonperforming loans to assets (not shown) declines slightly after a switch (the increase in loans is slower than the decrease in bad loans). This means that it is unlikely failure risk rises. Thus, overall, the performance evidence does not support a race for the bottom, managerial risk-taking, or scapegoating being the major reason why banks switch agencies.
To analyze whether examiners at only one or two regulatory agencies desire a quiet life, we look at the probability that banks regulated by a particular agency at the end of year t -1 switch to a new agency in year t. These results are presented in Table 8 . For the OCC and the FDIC, the coefficients on the loan portfolio change dummies have the same sign as in the full sample. This supports the quiet life hypothesis at these two agencies. Quiet banks regulated by the Federal
Reserve are less likely to switch, as in the full sample, but active banks are no more likely to switch than banks in the middle. The difference between quiet banks and all others is consistent with the quiet life hypothesis, while the result on active banks does not contradict the quiet life hypothesis.
To summarize, there is evidence of specialization among agencies prompting some switches, supporting Tiebout sorting. It also appears that examiners at all the agencies seem to desire a quiet life. At least some evidence against all of the other hypotheses exists at each agency since the risk-return tradeoff is improving while failure risk is not rising at any agency. This suggests that the dominant reasons for banks to switch regulators are to take advantage of Tiebout sorting, to avoid an examiner who wants a quiet life, or for reasons unrelated to regulation (such as to consolidate after a merger). 
Robustness
In this section, we present the results of several robustness checks. They support the results in the previous sections. To save space, only the qualitative results for the robustness tests are given.
Since some switches are motivated by reasons other than the actions of regulators, in Section 2 we looked at the subsample of banks that have not merged and either are not in a holding company or are the only bank in a holding company. However, this may not eliminate all the switches done for structural reasons. To drop those most likely to switch for structural reasons, we use the first regression in Table 4 to predict how likely a bank is to switch regulators. This model does not include any performance or loan variables, meaning that it isolates structural reasons for switching. We drop from the sample banks in the top ten percent of probability of 19 We also run the tests using samples including all banks that have not merged and are not in a multibank holding company. The results are qualitatively similar to those in the full sample, although three of the six regressions in Tables 6 and 8 do not converge. When we use all banks that have not merged (including those that are in a multibank holding company), we regain converge for those three regressions. However, some of the change variables that are significant in the full sample are not significant in those regressions.
switching regulators based on these predicted values (recall that about one percent of banks switch regulators every year). We rerun our tests on the remaining 90 percent of banks. The qualitative results are as in the previous sections. This is additional evidence that while organizational issues may be important, they are not driving the overall results.
If prior performance affects the probability of switching, as the results suggest, then it may also affect the post-switching performance. For example, the scapegoating hypothesis implies that banks blame declines in performance on regulators. One reason that we might not see this in aggregate data is that most banks had strong performance leading into a switch. We divide banks by whether or not return increased from year t-2 to year t and by whether or not nonperforming loans fell from year t-2 to year t. We then examine whether performance improves post-switch.
These results must be interpreted with extreme caution, since we are in some sense conditioning on what we are looking to find. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with the effect of a switch being independent of prior performance. In no case are the signs of the coefficients significantly different between the banks with strong and weak prior performance.
The bank failure rate rose throughout the 1980s and remained high in the early 1990s. On the other hand, banks made record profits in the late 1990s. This suggests that banking may have gone through two regimes during our sample: a period of decline in the 1980s as identified by Gorton and Rosen (1995) and a period of strength in the 1990s. To examine whether behavior differed across the regimes, we split the sample into two subperiods: 1983-1990 and 1991-1999 .
The break in the sample is between 1990 and 1991 because the number of bank failures started falling in 1991. The results of the predictive model (1) are similar for the two subperiods. But there is evidence that in the early part of the sample, return and leverage both declined in the two years following a change of regulators. The decline in return is consistent with managerial risk taking as a reason for switching regulators, but the decline in leverage is not.
This paper focuses on changes of primary federal regulators. There are two potential objections to this. First, it may be the choice of a national versus a state charter that matters, and not the further choice of whether to be a Federal Reserve System member. Using a switch of charters rather than a switch of primary federal regulators in our analysis does not change the qualitative results. When we replicate the regression in the fourth column of Table 4 using a charter change dummy as the dependent variable, the same coefficients are significant at the 5% confidence level. So, there is evidence in support of the quiet life since the loan portfolio change variables are both significant and of the correct sign. Examining risk and return before and after a charter change shows that return increases and risk does not change much, similar to the results for a switch of regulators. Finally, when we look at the individual charters, we find support for the Tiebout hypothesis. Banks are more likely to switch from a national charter to a state charter when they are increasing real estate construction loans and to switch in the other direction when they are increasing consumer loans.
A second issue for state-chartered banks is that regulation is shared between federal regulators and state regulators. To control for the effect of state regulators, we add state dummies for banks with a state charter. The qualitative results in the predictive regression are unchanged.
We also examined results on a state-by-state basis, but even for the largest states, there were not enough switches to obtain meaningful results.
Concluding comments
This paper attempts to shed some light on the effects of having multiple regulatory agencies in banking. This is important both for its implications in banking and for its contributions to the debate on the optimal regulatory structure. The debate over whether regulatory authority should be centralized or divided among different agencies has been long and heated, but there has been little direct empirical evidence brought to bear. By examining switches of primary federal regulators by banks, we are able to test the importance of different theories of regulation. We test whether there is beneficial specialization by agencies, whether the agencies race for the bottom, and whether examiners want a quiet life. We also examine managerial motivations for switches.
Our results strongly support a combination of beneficial specialization, that is, Tiebout sorting, and the quiet life hypothesis against the other alternatives. Banks are more likely to switch regulators when they are changing risk and loan portfolios, whether or not these changes increase risk. Banks not in a multibank holding company and not involved in a recent merger are also more likely to switch regulators when they are moving to an asset portfolio that may be more complicated for an examiner to monitor. Moreover, these changes appear to improve performance. When we look at individual bank regulators, there is support for Tiebout sorting and the quiet life hypothesis at all three regulators -the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC.
Periodically, questions are raised about whether bank regulatory authority should be consolidated into one agency. This paper suggests two possible benefits of the current regulatory structure. Bank regulators seem to specialize, allowing banks to pick the regulator that best matches their strategy. This regulatory specialization allows banks to move to a better risk-return tradeoff by switching regulators when they are switching business strategy. Another benefit is that if bank examiners are making it difficult for banks to make value-adding changes, then banks can improve performance by switching to a new examiner at a different agency. This last benefit is above and beyond any from the competition among regulators discussed in the previous literature in this area. H3: Quiet life -minimal change.
Loan portfolio changing (risk may be increasing or decreasing).
H4: Quiet life -simple. Changing to assets that are more difficult for an examiner to evaluate.
Panel B. Welfare-decreasing switches.

Hypothesis Prediction
H2: Race for the bottom. Risk is increasing and the risk-return tradeoff may shift in.
H5: Managerial risk-taking. Risk is increasing and the risk-return tradeoff may shift in.
H6: Scapegoating. Return is decreasing prior to a switch and does not increase after a switch. The risk-return tradeoff does not shift out after a switch. The first number in each cell is the number of banks and the second number is the fraction of all banks that switched regulators. Total sample includes all banks (excluding outliers and banks that switch regulators more than once), 1983-1999. Regulatory switchers is a subset of the total sample that includes year t-1 data for all banks that switch regulators in year t. Table 8 . Probability that a bank switches from a particular regulatory agency.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether a bank changes its primary federal regulator in year t. The dummy equals one if the bank changes regulators in year t and equals zero otherwise. For each regression, the sample includes all banks regulated by the named agency at the end of year t -1. The sample period is [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] Table 5A . Change in performance surrounding a switch of regulators, banks not in a multibank holding company with no recent mergers. Pre-and post-switch performance for banks that switch primary federal regulators. The data include the five years prior to a switch and the five years following a switch (but not the year of the switch). The dummy for years t-5 to t-1 equals one if a bank switches regulators in the next five years and zero otherwise. The other dummies are defined similarly. The trend variable for prior to the switch equals τ in year t if the bank switches regulators in year t -τ where t -τ is between one and five, and zero otherwise. 
